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THE SWANK DECISION: ECONOMIC INTEREST IN
COAL NOT DEPENDENT ON LEASE TERMINABILITY
TAX LAW: The percentage depletion deduction allowed by I.R.C.
§ 611 and § 613 may not be denied to lessees of coal in place because
their leases are terminable on 30 days notice. United States v. Swank,
101 S.Ct. 1931 (1981).
INTRODUCTION
Congress provides a percentage depletion deduction for taxpayers who
develop certain natural resources.' Section 613 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (hereinafter I.R.C.) provides that the deduction will be a
percentage of the gross income derived from the property, excluding from
gross income any rents or royalties paid by the taxpayer with respect to
the property.' The deduction exists as a matter of congressional grace.'
Originally, the deduction's purpose was to compensate taxpayers for
mineral exhaustion by returning the taxpayer's capital investment. 4 Pres-
ently, the deduction no longer turns on diminishment of capital invest-
ment. Instead, the deduction exists as a statement of congressional tax
policy encouraging the development of mineral deposits.'
In coal operations, the landowner may develop the mine himself, or
he may lease or contract that opportunity out to others. 6 The owner is
barred from claiming the depletion deduction by Section 631(c) of the
I.R.C.7 The Internal Revenue Service has required lessees or independent
contractors claiming the deduction to establish their economic interest in
the coal in place.' United States v. Swank9 addresses whether a lessee has
established a sufficient economic interest in the coal in place when the
lessee's interest is terminable on thirty days notice.
An economic interest in a mineral in place is created when the taxpayer
acquires an interest in the mineral in place by investment and depends
on the income derived from mineral extraction for return of capital. '0 The
I. The percentage depletion deduction is codified in 1.R.C. §§611, 613 (1982).
2. Section 613 provides sliding percentages for various classes of minerals, including coal.
3. Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 219 (1959).
4. Commisioner v. Southwest Explor. Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).
5. United States v. Swank, 101 S.Ct. 1931, 1935 (1981).
6. An employment contract or work contract does not normally give a miner a legal interest in
the mineral in place or when extracted. Henshaw & Minor, Short-notice terminability no bar to
lessee mineral depletion, says Sup. Ct. in Swank, 55 J. TAX. 102 (1981).
7. I.R.C. § 631(c) (1981). The owner does not qualify even if the lessee or contractor does not
qualify for the depletion deduction.
8. See Rev. Rul. 74-469, 1974-2 C.B. 1977; Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul.
74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 76-485, 1976-2 C.B. 187; Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B.
204; Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
9. 101 S.Ct. at 1931.
10. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
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Internal Revenue Service has adopted regulations describing "economic
interest":
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the tax-
payer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place or
standing timber and secures, by any form of legal relationship, in-
come derived from the extraction of the mineral or severance of the
timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital. '
The Supreme Court has provided guidelines for determining the ex-
istence of an economic interest. Parsons v. Smith'2 held that independent
contractors strip-mining coal on behalf of landowners were not entitled
to the deduction. The contractors received a fixed sum per ton of coal
from the landowners. The Court set out the following test to determine
the existence of an economic interest: (1) the taxpayers' investments were
in movable equipment, not the coal in place; (2) the investments were
recoverable through depreciation, not depletion; (3) the contracts were
completely terminable without cause on short notice; (4) the landowners
did not surrender any capital investment in the coal in place; (5) the coal
belonged to the landowners, depriving the taxpayers of the right to dispose
or deliver the coal elsewhere; (6) the taxpayers received fixed sums per
ton of coal mined and delivered; and (7) the taxpayers looked only to the
landowners for all sums due them under their contracts. 3
In Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 the
Court held a lessee, and not its independent contractor, was entitled to
the deduction. The Court said the right to mine to exhaustion was merely
an economic advantage, not an economic interest. 5
This casenote will survey the effect of terminability on the existence
of a lessee's economic interest. Conflict between the federal circuits on
the effect of terminability has now been resolved by the Swank decision. 6
PRE-SWANK TERMINABILITY INTERPRETATIONS
Prior to Swank, the Internal Revenue Service had maintained that ter-
minability was fatal to creation of an economic interest regardless of
whether mineral rights were acquired by lease or contract. '" No economic
11. 26 C.F.R. § 1.611-1(b) (1980).
12. 359 U.S. at 215.
13. Id. at 225.
14. 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
15. Id. at 633.
16. Generally, the Tax Court and Third Circuit held no economic interest exists when the lease
is terminable without cause or on short notice. The Court of Claims and Fifth Circuit disagreed. 34
AM. JUR. 2d Federal Taxation 766 at p. 712 (1981).
17. G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42 ("nominal" notice is usually less than I year); Rev. Rul.
77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
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interest was created when the agreement was "of insufficient duration to
permit extraction of a substantial amount of the mineral deposit." 8
The Tax Court had also maintained that terminability extinguished an
economic interest in the lessee or contractor.' 9 In addition, the lack of a
termination clause in the lease provided no guarantee that the taxpayer
possessed an economic interest."0 Market disposition was also consid-
ered."' However, a recent Tax Court opinion, Weaver v. Commissioner,"
signaled greater flexibility in interpreting the effect of terminability. The
Tax Court held a lessee entitled to the depletion deduction even though
the lease was terminable upon 120 days notice. Under the particular
circumstances of the lease, 120 days allowed the lessee enough time to
extract substantial amounts of sand and gravel.
The Court of Claims had been more liberal in its interpretation of
economic interest. Terminability was not recognized as a conclusive fac-
tor, but was weighed in light of the other six factors described in Parsons.23
The Court of Claims implied that lessees had an economic interest in
coal in place until the right of termination was exercised. At that point,
the economic interest reverted back to the lessor.2 4 The court noted that
in light of I.R.C. Section 631(c) the lessee must show entitlement or no
party would benefit from the deduction.25 The Internal Revenue Service
expressly rejected the Court of Claims' interpretation of terminability.2 6
The Third Circuit required that the lessee or contractor possess an eco-
nomic interest in the minerals in place which would not terminate until
the minerals were exhausted.27 When the lessee's or contractor's interest
in the coal was terminable upon notice or at will, no right to exhaust the
coal had been created. Therefore, the lessee or contractor was not entitled
to the deduction. 28 Terminability was analyzed relative to the other factors
found in Parsons, but terminability was accorded great weight. 29
The Fourth Circuit maintained that terminability at will was conclusive
18. Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178, at 179.
19. See Ramey v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 363 (1967), aff'd 398 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1968); Mullins
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967), acq. 1970-2 C.B. XX; Washburn v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.
217 (1965), taxpayer's appeal dismissed (10th Cir. 1965). Thirty day and 60 day termination clauses
have prevented entitlement. Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594, 608 (1979).
20. Merritt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 257, 281 (1962), aff'd, 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
21. Fink v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1119 (1958).
22. 72 T.C. 594.
23. Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973); see Thornberry Const.
Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. CI. 1978).
24. 485 F.2d at 641.
25. Id. at 642.
26. Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
27. Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1971). See Commissioner v. Mammoth
Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir. 1955).
28. 443 F.2d at 173.
29. Constantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (1971).
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in determining the existence of an economic interest.3" Lack of termin-
ability was a bargained-for right.3' The right to mine without fear of
termination created an economic interest in the coal in place.
32
The Fifth Circuit said a valid lease conveyed an economic interest even
if a party could terminate the arrangement on short notice.33 This circuit
distinguished other cases disallowing the deduction because of termina-
bility as involving "contracts merely for the removal of coal and not a
lease of the minerals in place." 34 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's allowance of
the deduction, in spite of terminability, may have benefited only lessees,
not independent contractors. The status given the relationship between
landowner and mine operator would be significant.
The Ninth Circuit asked whether the extractor of the mineral depended
on market disposition or relied solely on his contract for compensation.3 5
Terminability was only a secondary factor to be considered in determining
the existence of an economic interest.
36
The Tenth Circuit construed terminability in Rissler & McMurry Co.
v. United States.37 In that case, a taxpayer who entered into a construction
contract with a city elected to use the city's gravel pit for construction
materials. The taxpayer was allowed to sell the gravel to other parties
pursuant to an oral agreement with the city. The court considered the
taxpayer's interest in the gravel to be at most an economic advantage:
The taxpayer did not meet the Parsons and Paragon requirements
for the necessary showing of a capital investment in mineral deposits.
Rather the facts disclose that the taxpayer had not made any per-
manent improvements at the gravel pit, and the short-term contract
under which the taxpayer operated reflected no intention by the city
to surrender its interest in the gravel.38
Thus, the tenth circuit construed economic interest in accord with the
Parsons test. Terminability was not considered in isolation.
In summary, the question of the effect of terminability on establishing
economic interest had proved confusing. The spectrum of interpretation
30. McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963). ELM Development Co. v. Com-
missioner, 315 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1963). Terminability for default or unprofitability does not require
a finding of no economic interest.
31. 315 F.2d at 491.
32. Id.
33. Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 57 T.C. 249. But
see United States v. Wade, 381 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1967).
34. 496 F.2d at 999-1000.
35. Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1955).
36. Id.
37. 480 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Utah Salt Co. v. Wise, 370 F.2d 976 (10th Cir.
1967) which held there is no economic interest in salt in place.
38. 480 F.2d at 687.
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had ranged from treating terminability as conclusive to treating it as
insignificant. The Supreme Court in United States v. Swank39 resolved
the terminability question.
UNITED STATES V SWANK
In Swank v. United States,4' three separate lesseesa' of coal mines
brought tax refund suits claiming entitlement to the percentage depletion
deduction. The leases provided for a fixed royalty per ton of extracted
coal and gave the lessees the right to determine the sale price. Each lease
contained a termination provision allowing either party, or the lessor
alone, the right to cancel the agreement upon 30 days notice.42
The Court of Claims held that the lessees had an economic interest in
the coal in place, which entitled them to the percentage depletion. 43 "The
mere existence of the unused termination clause" did not deprive the
lessees of their economic interest in the coal in place." The court found
that the lessees had a "solid expectation" that the leases would not be
terminated prematurely.45 Also, if the lessees failed to qualify for the
depletion deduction, no other party could step forward to claim the al-
lowance. The court said that Congress intended that the percentage de-
pletion be utilized by some party to the coal-mining operation.46
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims in
United States v. Swank. 47 The majority opinion began by noting that the
original purpose behind the depletion deduction had been expanded. Im-
plementation of a percentage formula clearly reflected an emphasis on
mineral development. This emphasis explains why eligibility for the de-
pletion deduction depends on the parties' economic interest in the coal
and not on their capital investment. 48 Also, a finding that lessees possessed
an insufficient economic interest in the coal meant no party could benefit
from the deduction. The government recognized this potential result but
nonetheless argued that the deduction should not be granted to any party
where a claimed economic interest was terminable on short notice.49
The government challenged the lessees' eligibility for the allowance
on two grounds. First, the government contended that the lessees pos-
39. 101 S.Ct. 1931.
40. 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. C1. 1979), aff'd. 101 S.Ct. 1931 (1981).
41. Black Hawk Coal Co. operated mines in Kentucky. Swank operated in Pennsylvania. Bull
Run Mining Co. operated in West Virginia.
42. 602 F.2d at 350.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 351.
46. Id.
47. 101 S.Ct. 1931 (1981).
48. Id. at 1935.
49. Id. at 1936.
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sessed a mere economic advantage over the coal, not an economic interest
in it, because their leases were terminable on short notice.5 0 The gov-
ernment cited Parsons and Paragon Jewel as holding that contract miners
lacked sufficient economic interest in the coal in place to entitle them to
the depletion deduction. The Court distinguished both cases on the ground
that terminability was only one factor among many that the Court had
considered in holding the contractors ineligible for the deduction.5' The
Court found that in Swank the lessees possessed a legal interest in the
coal both before and after it was mined, as well as the freedom to dispose
of it in the market place. 2
Second, the government argued terminability made the lessees' interest
too tenuous to sustain eligibility for the allowance.53 The government
contended that the lessor may be forced to terminate the lease agreement
and seek a more advantageous royalty agreement if the market price of
coal increases. The Court rejected this argument. 4 Other factors, such
as the quantity of coal extracted and a satisfactory business relationship,
were as important as royalty rates. The fact that no actual termination
had occurred under any of the leases, even though coal had increased in
value, defeated the government's argument. In addition, the Court con-
strued congressional intent as not limiting the deduction to only those
mining operations strong enough to bargain away terminability in their
lease agreements. Last, the Court could find no rational basis for tying
the allowance to the period of time the lessee operates a mine. The
depletion deduction should not depend on "whether the entire operation
is conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a series of
taxpayers for successive shorter periods." 55
Thus, the Court cleared away the considerable confusion coloring the
terminability issue. The Court held that the right of termination does not
destroy the lessees' economic interest in the coal. 56
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. The dissent criti-
cized the majority for overstepping the proper role of the judiciary. Justice
White noted that I.R.S. regulations must be afforded substantial weight
by a reviewing court if the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute
is reasonable.57 Prior court cases, including Paragon Jewel, had expressly
accepted and applied the regulations describing economic interest. Since
50. Id. at 1937.
51. Id. at 1938.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1939.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1941.
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economic interest is not "self-defining," 58 the "Service's interpretation
of its own regulation is entitled to deference.'59
The dissent cited National Muffler Dealers Assoc. v. United States,60
for the proposition that even when a regulation is subject to differing
interpretations, the court should defer to the Service if the Commissioner's
interpretation is consistent, long-standing and reasonable. The dissent
argued that the Internal Revenue Service had consistently concluded that
duration of the lease interest was important in determining deduction
eligibility. This Internal Revenue Service conclusion was reasonable and
warranted deference from the Court.6'
In addition, the dissent claimed the majority either overemphasized or
misconstrued the factors described in Parsons and Paragon Jewel. Justice
White said the right to mine to exhaustion was a mere economic advan-
tage. The fact that the lessees did mine to exhaustion was irrelevant.
62
Further, the costs of mining did not alone create an economic interest
because such costs are deductible or depreciable under other code pro-
visions." Last, Justice White claimed that terminability was at least as
important as market disposition because:
... reliance on the market for economic return on [the lessee's]
investment is therefor6 illusory since it is dependent on the lessor's
willingness to permit continued extraction of the coal. 64
ANALYSIS
The Swank decision has ramifications for both tax planners and liti-
gators. For tax planners, Swank clarifies a narrow tax issue. Tax planners
now know that terminability is not considered crucial to determining the
existence of an economic interest. The obvious implication of this decision
is that minimizing terminability as a dispositive factor necessarily in-
creases the importance to be afforded the other Parsons factors. However,
the Swank decision is construed by its dissent as placing great weight on
control of market disposition. If control of market disposition is conclu-
sive in determining deduction entitlement, that factor will be crucial in
future negotiations of lease agreements. Tax planners should carefully
consider the tax consequences of market disposition when negotiating
and drafting lease agreements.
The decision also has ramifications for tax litigation. Swank implies
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
61. 101 S. Ct. at 1942.
62. Id. at 1943.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1944.
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that congressional policy is circumvented when no taxpayer establishes
entitlement to the depletion deduction. Arguably, any Internal Revenue
Service interpretation of a statutory allowance which does not benefit at
least one taxpayer violates congressional policy. The case may be useful
in situations where taxpayers fail to establish entitlement to tax benefits
because of Internal Revenue Service guidelines. The Internal Revenue
Service may encounter increased litigation of other statutory interpreta-
tions if a potential consequence is that no party may benefit from a
statutory allowance.
On a broader scale, Swank signals strong judicial activism in the tax
area. The Court will not always abide by Internal Revenue Service inter-
pretations of I.R.C. regulations, even if lower federal courts ratify those
interpretations. Thus, even reasonable agency interpretations may be sub-
ject to judicial analysis. A consequence of this increased activism may
be increased litigation of Internal Revenue Service interpretations.
CONCLUSION
Swank provides a necessary resolution to the confusing question of
lease terminability. However, while the importance of terminability has
been resolved, the importance of other Parsons factors, like control of
market disposition, remains unclear. Swank may also have implications'
for judicial review of agency guidelines.
JAY ROSENBLUM
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